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We evaluate the effect of teachers’ wages on pupils’ 
achievement in a developing country (Brazil), using a 
good quality micro-dataset (the 2001 wave of SAEB). 
We estimate education production functions to inves-
tigate “whether teachers’ wages matter”, and we also 
apply quantile regressions to asses “for whom they 
matter most”. Results show that teachers’ wages 
have a small, positive, average effect on pupils’ 
scores in private, but not in public schools, in both 
Portuguese and Mathematics tests. In private 
schools, Portuguese teachers’ wages have a greater 
impact on the scores of low-performing than of high-
performing pupils, while in Mathematics no clear pat-
tern is revealed. Main results are maintained when 
instrumental variables and two-stage least absolute 
deviation estimations are carried out. Our analysis 
suggests that there is scope for Brazilian public 
schools to improve their human resources policies, 
with potential benefits accruing to low-performing pu-
pils. 
	

Starting with the seminal works of Shultz (1963) and 
Becker (1964) economists have recognized that the 
acquisition of human capital is an important determi-
nant of a wide range of economic outcomes of both 
individuals and societies (Harmon, Oosterbeek & 
Walker, 2003; Sianesi & Van Reenen, 2000). Since 
then, a number of studies have been trying to map 
the technology for the production of human capital.  
It is a much-debated topic whether merely investing 
in more school resources can improve human capi-
tal, as measured by student performance. Starting 
with the Coleman report (Coleman et al., 1966), a 
common and persistent finding is that school re-
sources have a small, or even nil, impact on student 
achievement, and that socio-economic characteris-
tics account for most of the variation in student per-
formance (Hanushek, 1986; 1997; 2002; Woessman, 
2001). The evidence of an absence of a school-
resource effect has been frequently challenged 
mostly through methodological and data contesta-
tions (Card & Krueger, 1992, Figlio, 1999; Dewey, 
Husted & Kenny, 2000), but it still remains an open 
question (Belfield, 2000; Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin, 
1999; Vignoles et al, 2000). 
Concerning the effects of teacher wages in particu-
lar, evidence is similarly mixed. There is some evi-
dence that a good teacher matters for pupils’ per-
formance. Hanushek (2002), for example, compares 
pupils within districts in the US and concludes that 
the performance gap between pupils that had a good 
teacher and those with a bad one can be substantial. 
This result seems to be confirmed by some other 
studies (cf. evidence discussed by Vignoles et al., 
2000), although it is contested by others (Pritchett & 
Filmer, 1999). If teacher quality does matter, increas-
ing teachers’ wages would constitute an obvious 
means for acquiring it.  
But there are other good reasons for investigating 
whether teachers’ wages matter for student achieve-
ment. In fact, despite of recent technological ad-
vances, schooling remains essentially a labor-
intensive sector, and wages still represent the most 
important share of educational budgets in many 
countries. If aiming at the efficacy of public expendi-
tures is of paramount relevance in developed coun-
tries, it is all the more important in developing coun-
tries where budget constraints faced by governments 
are typically more binding. For example, in 2001, 
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wages of teachers and school staff together ac-
counted for 77% of total expenditures on primary and 
secondary education in the country we focus on in 
this study, Brazil (OECD, 2001). 
Assessing whether teachers’ wages have an impact 
on student achievement is therefore of extreme pol-
icy relevance in developing countries, but the exer-
cise might also be insightful for shedding light  on 
findings obtained in the estimations of education pro-
duction functions for developed countries. Indeed, 
one possible reason why inputs do not seem to have 
a considerable impact on output in education produc-
tion functions may be the lack of sufficient variation 
on the input side. In industrialized countries, school 
resources in general, and teachers’ wages in particu-
lar, could have reached a threshold level above 
which input variation does not affect student perform-
ance, or just affects it very slightly. In poor countries, 
where the wage dispersion is typically large, teach-
ers' wages might have a more significant effect 
(Case & Deaton, 1999; Belfield, 2000).  
This paper assesses the effect of teachers' wages on 
student performance, exploiting the features of a de-
veloping country in which the variation in teacher 
wages is considerable. We use a unique micro data-
set, provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Education, 
namely the 2001 wave of SAEB (Basic Education 
Assessment System). Following Eide & Showalter 
(1998), we try to answer not only whether teachers’ 
wages matter, but also for whom they really matter. 
Education production function studies typically report 
average effects of a vector of resources on student 
achievement. Quantile regression (QR), in turn, al-
lows us to assess the effect of teachers’ wages on 
achievement at different points of the conditional dis-
tribution of educational achievement. Clearly, QR 
can contribute to the debate on the absence of 
school resources: while the relationship between in-
puts and performance may be small on average, it 
may be large for some particular types of students (i.
e. specific conditional quantiles of performance). 
However, the policy implications of findings based on 
QR estimations go far beyond the debate around the 
absence of resource effect, as they relate to equity 
issues. Identifying who benefits more from such an 
important school input is a requirement for the design 
of accurately targeted policy interventions. 
Our paper brings evidence that is not only relevant 
for the economics of education literature, but also for 
a broader economic perspective – on whether wages 
reflect productivity. Wage is often assumed to be a 
proxy for a worker’s productivity in economic analysis 
when markets function adequately. Specifically in the 
educational sector, individuals would face choices 
between working at different schools, or between 
working in the educational sector and elsewhere. 
More skilled individuals would be attracted by better 
compensations offered to teachers relative to those 
offered by other sectors. Within the teachers’ market, 
better teachers would also be attracted by better re-
wards (Southwick & Gill, 1997; Dolton & Van der 
Klaauw, 1999; Angrist & Guryan, 2003). Too low 
relative wages in the educational sector would create 
an adverse selection problem, leading less-able 
graduates to make the choice of becoming teachers 
and thus lowering the overall level of teacher quality 
(Hoxby & Leigh, 2003; Lankford & Wyckoff, 1997). 
The same argument holds for low relative wages 
within the teachers’ profession. Even beyond the 
strictly selection issue, better teachers would be ex-
pected to have higher wages in the presence of 
some form of reward to merit in the teaching profes-
sion. If teachers’ labor markets operated just like 
competitive markets described in economics text-
books suggest, we would expect better teachers to 
receive higher wages. But this is not realistic in many 
settings, especially when a considerable fraction of 
many schooling systems is run by the state. In public 
schools, teachers' wages are typically determined by 
age, tenure, political indications and other factors not 
necessarily related to skills, merit or productivity.  
We can sum up by pointing out three hypotheses 
that we test in this paper: (i) whether teachers’ 
wages matter for students’ achievement in a devel-
oping country, (ii) whether the conditional correlation 
of teachers’ wages and pupils’ scores is stronger in 
private schools than in public schools, and (iii) 
whether there are variations in the conditional corre-
lation of teachers’ wages with students’ test scores 
along the test scores’ distribution, suggesting hetero-
geneity in the pupil-teacher relationship.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we 
present the dataset. In section 3, we present the em-
pirical strategy and OLS results. In section 4, we jus-
tify the use of QR and discuss the results. Section 5 
addresses potential endogeneity. In section 6 we 
summarize the results and discuss some policy impli-
cations. Section 7 contains the conclusions.  
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The data we use come from the 2001 wave of SAEB 
(Basic Education Assessment System), a survey on 
pupils' achievement carried out by INEP, a research 
bureau subordinated to the Brazilian Ministry of Edu-
cation. While the SAEB is not suitable for interna-
tional comparisons, its objectives and statistical de-
sign, and the procedures employed in the application 
of the test, have been inspired by, and do not differ 
very much from, well-known cross-country assess-
ments of pupils’ performance, such as PISA, TIMMS/
PIRLS, and LLECE3.  
SAEB consists of countrywide tests that evaluate pu-
pils’ cognitive abilities in literacy (Portuguese exam4) 
and numeracy (Mathematics exam). Test score infor-
mation is coupled with data on relevant features of 
pupils and their family, as well as teachers’, princi-
pals’ and schools’ characteristics. The database con-
sists of repeated cross-sections (not panels) of repre-
sentative samples of schools and students. Firstly, 
schools are randomly chosen to take part in the 
SAEB. Secondly, one class inside each school is ran-
domly selected. All students of a given selected class 
have to pass the SAEB exam, but only in one of the 
subjects. 
SAEB focuses on the evaluation of pupils at three 
key stages of their formal education: 4th and 8th year 
of primary school, and 3rd year of secondary school. 
Each of these grades corresponds to the last year of 
a stage in the Brazilian schooling system, which are: 
the end of first half of primary school (during which 
students have one teacher for all subjects), the end 
of second half of primary school (during which stu-
dents have one teacher for each subject), and the 
end of secondary school (after which students can 
pass college admission exams). Schooling is manda-
tory in Brazil for children up to 14 years, regardless of 
the grade they are attending. The 8th grade sample 
constitutes the best approximation for the end of com-
pulsory schooling, since most of its students are in 
fact around 14 years old5. Moreover, 8th grade pupils 
are less likely to have dropped out than 3rd grade of 
secondary school pupils. Finally, the 8th grade data-
sets have fewer missing data in key questions (e.g., 
pupil’s age, mother’s education, and number of books 
at home) as compared to the 4th grade. For these rea-
sons, we focus exclusively on the 8th grade sample. 
Pupils' test scores correspond to subject-specific 
pedagogical scales elaborated by INEP staff together 
with teachers, researchers, and national and interna-
tional survey experts. Possible scores range from 0 to 
500, and are supposed to evaluate skills and abilities 
of students. The SAEB scale is continuous and hierar-
chical, which means that a pupil who achieves a cer-
tain score – say, 400 in the Portuguese test – has all 
the literacy skills held by students who scored 150, 
300 or 380, plus some additional skills. For example, 
he might be able to understand and interpret more 
complex texts than his peers who scored lower. Be-
cause of the invariance of the scale, pupils' scores are 
comparable across years and across grades. Scores 
are not comparable across subjects, but the distribu-
tions of scores do not look very different in Portuguese 
and in Mathematics6. Finally, it should be mentioned 
that the data used to construct the variable that ex-
presses tax revenues per head for each Brazilian mu-
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nicipality (TAXPERHEAD) was obtained from the 
Brazilian Ministry of Finance7 and was appended to 
the SAEB datasets. 
 
2.1. Summary statistics 
 
Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 present summary statis-
tics concerning the final samples used in our estima-
tions (28,605 observations in Portuguese and 27,942 
in Mathematics).  
The variable SCORE stands for the score pupils at-
tained in the exam. Figure 1 show histograms and 
kernel density graphs for this variable. Whereas the 
distribution of SCORE in the Portuguese exam for 
the pooled samples (i.e. all types of schools) resem-
bles a normal distribution, the Mathematics one is 
skewed to the left. Tables 1 and 2 show that average 
scores are 249.31 in Portuguese (standard deviation: 
49.85) and 258.02 in Mathematics (s.d.: 53.45). As 
for the distributions of SCORE by type of school, it is 
clear that, on average, private schools’ pupils per-
form better than public schools’ ones. In Portuguese 
average scores are 279.06 in private schools versus 
232.73 in public schools. In Mathematics, we have 
295.37 versus 236.89. 
The variable TEACHERWAGE expresses teachers’ 
gross monthly wage, expressed in “salários míni-
mos” (sm), an index often used in Brazilian adminis-
trative data8. Figure 2 shows histograms of teachers’ 
wages for both subjects, for the pooled samples. 
TEACHERWAGE is a discrete variable and its val-
ues range from 0.5 to 15 sm in all samples9. Both 
means and dispersions of teachers’ wages are 
higher in private than in public schools: 
Portuguese: average is 5.98 (standard devia-
tion: 3.69) in private schools versus 4.57 (2.69) 
in public ones; 
Mathematics: 6.62 (3.85) in private schools ver-
sus 4.69 (2.95) in public ones.  
Following Carroll (1963) and subsequent literature10, 
we can identify five factors that determine students 
learning rate: '(i) aptitude, (ii) ability to understand 
instructions, (iii) perseverance, (iv) opportunity, and 
(v) quality of instruction'. We use these categories as 
references for the choice of our control variables. Ta-
bles 1 (Portuguese) and 2 (Mathematics) contain de-
scriptive statistics of selected variables used in the 
regressions. 
Firstly, to account for observable individual charac-
teristics (potentially related to points i to iv), we in-
clude pupil’s AGE, GENDER and race. Gender is a 
standard control variable. Although the mode is 14 
years old in both samples, there is a broad range of 
ages within the considered grade sample (from 11 to 
19). We can expect age to affect motivation, self-
confidence and maturity of the pupils. We include 
dummies for self-reported pupil’s race (BLACK and 
MIXED). On average, mixed individuals are poorer 
than whites in Brazil, and blacks are the poorest race 
group, so this dummy not only plays the role of a 
control for unobserved variables related to race, but 
it is also a control for the socio-economic status. 
Secondly, we control for pupils’ family environment. 
We use measures of their mother’s education 
(MISCED), family wealth (as measured by the num-
ber of employees at home: NMAIDS), the number of 
books at home (as a proxy for the family interest in 
learning and as a home educational resource: 
NBOOKS), and the type of family structure the pupil 
lives in (with or without both parents: NONNU-
CLEAR). These variables might affect the motivation, 
level of effort and opportunities of the pupils as well 
as their ability to understand instructions. 
Thirdly, to account specifically for pupil effort (point 
iii), we use information on the frequency with which 
pupils do their homework when asked to do it 
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(HMWK)11. We also have information about whether 
the pupil repeated grades (RETENTION) and how 
often. We use that as an imperfect control for past 
effort12. 
Fourthly, we include measures of the quality of 
schooling (point v) received by pupils. We have infor-
mation on class size (student/teacher ratio: STRA-
TIO), a dummy for the availability of a library at the 
school (LIBRARY), the quality of the air (AIR) and 
light (LIGHT) in classrooms, and the number of com-
puters available for pupil use (NCOMP). Moreover, 
we include the gross monthly wage of the principal 
as a control for her overall level of competence 
(PRINCWAGE).  
Finally, we add controls for regional specificities, first 
by means of indicator variables for the 27 Brazilian 
states (from UF1 to UF27), aimed at capturing state-
specific heterogeneity. We also include a control for 
more local characteristics, namely data on tax reve-
nues per head by municipality (TAXPERHEAD), in 
order to account for variations in economic resources 
that could affect both scores and teachers’ wages, 
independently of the actual productivity level of 
teachers13.  
As for teachers’ characteristics, we assume that, 
conditional on having or not a university degree 
(TCHCOLLEGE), all other unobservable characteris-
tics related to teachers’ quality are subsumed in their 
wages. The observed teacher variables that are 
used as predetermined instruments in IV and two-
stage least absolute deviation estimations (section 5) 
are assumed not to affect teacher quality on aver-
age. They include: teachers’ gender (TCHGENDER), 
teachers’ experience in teaching the tested discipline 
(TCHEXP), monthly hours of work (TCHHOURS) 
and a dummy indicating whether the teacher has an-
other job besides teaching (TCHJOB).  
In all estimations we use as dependent variable a 
standardized version of SCORE, with its mean set to 
500, and its standard deviation set to 100 (labeled 
STDSCORE). The explanatory variable is a stan-
dardized version of TEACHERWAGE, with mean 0, 
and standard deviation 1 (labeled STDTEACHER-
WAGE). These standardizations were carried out in 
order to make the interpretation of the coefficients 
clearer. We do not report these standardized vari-
ables in Tables 1 and 2, since by definition their 
means and standard deviations are the same across 
samples. 
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As mentioned before, scores have been standard-
ized such that the mean for this variable is 500, with 
a standard deviation of 100 (STDSCORE), and 
teachers’ wages have been set to have mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1 (STDTEACHERWAGE). 
Thanks to these transformations, estimated effects of 
teacher wages on scores can be interpreted in an 
intuitive way. For example, when we run simple OLS 
regressions, having STDSCORE as the dependent 
variable and STDTEACHERWAGE as explanatory 
variable, plus a constant, we obtain the following un-
controlled or gross effects of teachers’ wages on 
scores: 
 Portuguese – pooled sample: 22.67; private 
schools: 23.57; public schools: 8.64. 
 Mathematics – pooled sample: 28.60; private 
schools: 25.88; public schools: 10.31. 14 
Hence, in private schools, a change of 1 unit of Por-
tuguese teachers’ wages (that is, 1 standard devia-
tion of teachers’ wages) corresponds with a change 
of 23.57 points of pupils score (that is, 23.57% of 
standard deviation of pupils’ scores). In public 
schools, in turn, a change of 1 standard deviation of 
Portuguese teachers’ wages corresponds with a 
change of only 8.64 points of score. Note that the re-
sults for Mathematics are not essentially different 
from those for Portuguese, although coefficients are 
systematically larger in the former. 
We would like to understand how these gross coeffi-
cients are affected when we include covariates. Does 
the relationship between scores and teachers’ wages 
remain positive and significant? Do differences be-
tween public and private schools coefficients persist? 
Are Mathematics coefficients systematically higher 
than Portuguese ones? Our baseline strategy con-
sists of controlling for observable variables. We esti-
mate by OLS an education production function for 
SAEB scores obtained by 8th grade pupils, in each 
subject (Portuguese and Mathematics), where test 
scores are a function of teachers' gross monthly 
wages: 
(STDSCORE)i =  + (STDTEACHERWAGE)i  
+ Xi + X²i + i                             (1) 
where: X is a vector of control variables, and  is the 
error term.  
Note that by including in (1) a vector (X²) containing 
the squares of the continuously-valued right-hand 
side variables, we avoid imposing linearity in the re-
lationship between right-hand side variables and the 
outcome variable (score), a procedure inspired by 
the work of Figlio (1999). We do not claim that the 
inclusion of X² provides some particular economic 
intuition; however, we prefer not to restrict arbitrarily 
our education production function to a linear form. In 
the presentation of results (section 3.2) we explain 
why we use the specification stated in Equation 1 
and not a more general one, which would include the 
square of STDTEACHERWAGE. 
3.1. Partitioning public and private schools  
samples
In Brazil, a private schooling system co-exists with a 
public one. In addition to the estimations for the 
pooled samples, we also estimate our models sepa-
rately for private and public schools. There are sev-
eral reasons for doing so. First of all, our data re-
veals the existence of important differences between 
public and private schools. In the summary statistics, 
we observe that average scores of private schools 
students are between 20 to 25% higher than those of 
public schools. We also notice that, on average, pri-
vate schools teachers earn 30 to 40% more than 
their public school counterparts. When we turn to 
control variables, the differences are also striking. 
For example, pupils in private schools live much less 
often in non-nuclear families (about 26%, against 
about 40% in public schools), have highly educated 
mothers (on average, they have a college degree, 
while pupils’ mothers in public schools do not), live in 
.7H>
			+		.M,12
$W,	
	2 

+	



-
+448.1448>4440U?	44031
44>L44..
	 !"
#$%&
Page  10 
Les Cahiers de Recherche en Éducation et Formation  - n° 43 - August 2005 
wealthier families with more books and do more 
homework. Private school infrastructure is also much 
better than that of the public sector (attested by vari-
ables LIBRARY, NCOMP and STRATIO). School 
principals earn, on average, around 45% more in pri-
vate than in public schools.  
Of course, these differences in average values of de-
pendent, explanatory and control variables do not 
make the case for partitioning the sample – indeed 
these differences are controlled for in our estima-
tions. However, based on the data and on our own 
knowledge of the Brazilian educational sector, we 
believe there might be heterogeneity of pupil's and 
teachers’ characteristics from one type of school to 
another, which go beyond observable variables. If 
this is true, we can suspect that private and public 
schools operate in very different environments, and 
are allocated extremely different mixes of inputs. The 
technological setting for the production of education 
is potentially different from one type of school to an-
other. For example, by means of the payment of ex-
pensive tuition fees, parents supply Brazilian private 
schools with resources that allow some of these 
schools to operate in an environment that resembles 
that of good schools in developed countries. Public 
schools, in turn, must cope with much more con-
strained budget sets. 
In addition to that, studying in public schools is so-
cially stigmatizing. All the parents who can afford it 
prefer to enroll their children in private schools, gen-
erally identified as “good schools”15. 
Another reason why it is interesting to look at private 
and public schools separately relates to their respec-
tive funding and managing characteristics. Private 
schools are neither funded nor managed by the pub-
lic authority, which significantly modifies their deci-
sion-making environment and the nature of their 
budget constraints as compared to public schools16. 
Private schools are put in competition with other 
schools in the educational market, whereas public 
schools are managed by the state and respond to 
bureaucratic rules. 
Finally - and probably more importantly given the 
topic of the paper - there are striking differences be-
tween the private and the public systems concerning 
the functioning of teachers’ labor market. In private 
schools, there is almost a free teachers’ labor mar-
ket: recruitment procedures and wage settings are 
decided on a decentralized basis, subject to some 
constraints imposed by unions and collective bar-
gaining rules. Each school is considerably free to 
make decisions related to teacher hiring and per-
formance rewarding. In the public system, in turn, 
there is no free market for teachers. Recruitment 
should in principle be done by means of public con-
tests, but many teachers are allocated to their jobs 
by politicians or by other, non-competitive, means. 
Wages are determined according to general guide-
lines stated by the federal authority (ministry of edu-
cation), but mainly by state-level and/or municipal-
level decision-makers. Public schools cannot decide 
autonomously to pay higher salaries in order to at-
tract better teachers, nor to reward such teachers, 
who are supposedly the ones who could lead pupils 
to attain better performance.  
As a consequence of all that, we believe that the ef-
fect on student scores of an important input like 
teachers' wages should not be estimated (only) by 
taking the pooled sample and assuming a constant 
coefficient for all types of schools. Although we al-
ways report and comment the results concerning the 
pooled sample for each subject, it seems meaningful 
to estimate private and public schools’ coefficients 
separately. In order to keep results comparable when 
we use partitioned samples, we standardize the de-
pendent variable (STDSCORE) and the explanatory 
variable (STDTEACHERWAGE) by subset, such that 
means and standard deviations are adjusted, respec-
tively, to 500 and 100, and to 0 and 1, in every sub-
sample. 
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3.2. OLS results 
Tests of structural change (F- or Chow-tests)17 in-
form us that we can reasonably reject the null hy-
pothesis that the coefficient , associated with the 
vector of squared control variables, is equal to zero, 
a conclusion that holds for both subjects. However, 
we cannot reject the null hypotheses that the coeffi-
cients associated with the square of STDTEACHER-
WAGE are equal to zero. These tests suggest that 
the specification we use here (linear in 
STDTEACHERWAGE and nonlinear in X) is more 
adequate than the linear functional form usually em-
ployed in education production functions, a result 
which is in line with those obtained by Figlio (1999). 
In the remaining of the paper, we make use of this 
specification, stated in Equation 1.  
Tables 3 (Portuguese) and 4 (Mathematics) contain 
coefficients and standard deviations for the pooled 
sample in each subject. Control variables yield sig-
nificant coefficients, whose signs are in line with 
standard results found in the literature.18 
According to this baseline OLS estimation, teachers’ 
wages maintain a small but positive and significant 
(at 1% level) correlation with student test scores in 
the pooled samples, even after controlling for a great 
number of covariates. In Portuguese, the coefficient 
is 3.36, which means that a change of 1 unit in 
teacher’s wage (i.e., 1 standard deviation of 
teacher’s wage) corresponds to a change of 3.36 
points of pupils score (that is, 3.36% of standard de-
viation of pupils’ scores). A similar result is obtained 
in Mathematics, although the coefficient is smaller 
(2.38). So the pooled sample results suggest that 
teachers’ wages do matter for students’ achievement 
in Brazil. After including an extensive set of control-
ling variables, the relationship between scores and 
teachers’ wages remains positive and statistically 
significant in both subjects. However, it drops sub-
stantially in comparison to the gross coefficients: in 
Portuguese, it drops from 22.67 (uncontrolled) to 
3.36 (controlled); in Mathematics, it drops even fur-
ther – from 28.60 to 2.38.  
How large are these coefficients? How much do 
teachers’ wages matter for students’ achievement in 
Brazil? Turning back to the non-standardized ver-
sions of our explanatory and dependent variables 
(TEACHERWAGE and SCORE), we can see that 
conditional on all covariates, an increase in Portu-
guese teachers’ gross monthly wages of 1 standard 
deviation (that is, 3.16 sm, or about US$215) is as-
sociated with an increase of 3.36% of standard de-
viation of scores (that is, 1.67 points in the test). In 
Mathematics, an increase of 1 standard deviation of 
teachers’ gross monthly wages (that is, 3.43 sm, or 
about US$233) is associated with an increase of 
2.38% of standard deviation of scores (that is, 1.27 
points in the test). Such conditional correlations be-
tween scores and teachers’ wages look very small. If 
they reflected causality between teacher’s wages 
and pupils’ scores, then, in order to obtain very mod-
est increases in students’ performances, it would be 
necessary to increase teachers’ wages by more than 
US$2400 dollars per year – a substantial amount, in 
a country where the GNP per capita is not much 
higher than US$3000 dollars, and given that teach-
ers’ wages already represent a substantial fraction of 
the educational budget. 
However, it is important to qualify the conclusion of a 
small coefficient in two dimensions. First, it should be 
emphasized that STDTEACHERWAGE coefficient 
remains positive and significant, even after the inclu-
sion of an extensive amount of controlling variables 
in the regression. Although small in absolute terms, 
the coefficients obtained can be considered to be 
relatively “large” as compared to a series of findings 
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in the economics of education literature, suggesting 
that school inputs in general, and teachers’ wages in 
particular do not matter for students’ learning, at 
least in developed countries (cf. introduction). More-
over, part of our covariates accounts for pupils’ fam-
ily and social environment, which are usually pointed 
as the essential determinants of pupils’ performance, 
but still a typical and important school input such as 
teachers’ wages turns out to be significant in our esti-
mations. 
The second qualification to the small-coefficient con-
clusion is that for the moment we have overlooked 
an important characteristic of the Brazilian schooling 
system, namely its division into two types of school: 
private and public. Indeed, the coefficients associ-
ated with the private-school dummy (PRIVATE) are 
positive and very high in both subjects (39.05 and 
45.58 respectively). It is useful to check whether the 
differences between public and private schools gross 
coefficients remain after the inclusion of control vari-
ables. Tables 3 and 4 also show the results for the 
partitioned samples. The picture obtained is quite dif-
ferent depending on the type of school. For both sub-
jects, the STDTEACHERWAGE coefficient in private 
schools is larger than that of the pooled sample (7.21 
in Portuguese and 3.94 in Mathematics) and both are 
significant at the 1% level. For public schools, in both 
subjects, coefficients of teachers’ wages are very 
small, and, indeed, can not be considered statisti-
cally different from zero. So the hypothesis that in 
private schools the conditional effects of teachers’ 
wages on scores are stronger than in public schools 
is largely supported by our OLS results, even after 
controlling extensively for many different types of fac-
tors. The effect is more pronounced in Portuguese 
than in Mathematics.  
How much do teachers’ wages matter for students’ 
achievement in Brazilian private schools? Turning 
back, once again, to the non-standardized versions 
of our explanatory and dependent variables 
(TEACHERWAGE and SCORE), we can see that 
conditional on all covariates, an increase in Portu-
guese teachers’ gross monthly wages of 1 standard 
deviation (that is, 3.69 sm, or about US$250) is as-
sociated with an increase of 7.21% of standard de-
viation of scores (that is, 3.26 points in the test). In 
Mathematics, an increase of 1 standard deviation of 
teachers’ wages (that is, 3.85 sm, or a little more 
than US$260) is associated with an increase of 
3.94% of standard deviation of scores (that is, 1.99 
points in the test). The marginal increase in pupils’ 
scores is larger in private schools as compared to 
the pooled sample, but the correspondent increase 
in wages also has to be larger for private school 
teachers. So once again we conclude that these con-
ditional correlations are not extremely large. The in-
creases in tuition fees that would be necessary to 
finance such an increment in wages would be sub-
stantial, with modest results in terms of increase in 
scores. 
The first qualification mentioned for the pooled sam-
ple coefficients also holds in the case of private 
schools samples coefficients. In fact, coefficients re-
main positive and significant even after the inclusion 
of a great number of control variables, which makes 
our results somewhat different from usual findings in 
the literature. More importantly, we have provided 
evidence that there is a clear difference between pri-
vate and public schools with respect to the condi-
tional effects of teachers’ wages on scores. Finally, 
we have seen that the conditional correlation be-
tween teachers’ wages and scores resists more 
strongly to the inclusion of covariates in Portuguese 
than in Mathematics, in all the samples. We will 
come back to this issue in following sections. 
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Education production function studies typically report 
average effects on some outcome variable (typically, 
student achievement) of school resources, family re-
sources, or other relevant inputs. However, a major 
drawback of methods such as OLS and IV is that 
they estimate only a constant coefficient, the condi-
tional mean. Quantile regression (QR), on the con-
trary, allows us to assess the effect of resources 
(here: teachers’ wages) on achievement (here: 
scores) at different points of the conditional distribu-
tion of educational achievement. 
Understanding the effect of an educational input, 
such as teachers’ wages, along the distribution of 
scores may be relevant for various reasons. Firstly, 
there is no reason to impose the coefficients associ-
ated with the explanatory variable to be constant 
along the distribution of scores. The impact of a 
given educational input on students’ performance 
might be different according to the type of student. 
Low-performing students could benefit from an in-
creased quality of teachers to obtain careful explana-
tions and helpful support, which would eventually im-
prove their skills, while for high-performing pupils 
such increased quality would be useless (they would 
have learned anyway). Inversely, high-performing 
students could gain more than low-performing ones 
from an increase in teacher quality, if the low-
performing pupils were not able to benefit from the 
extra knowledge brought about by the teacher. We 
did not have a clear expectation with regards to the 
relationship between teachers’ wages and scores – 
whether it is larger for low- or for high-performing stu-
dents –but we would not be surprised if the coeffi-
cient actually varied from one quantile to another. 
A second reason for studying the effect of teachers’ 
wages along the distribution of score is closely re-
lated to a long-lasting debate in economics of educa-
tion, about whether school inputs affect student per-
formance (cf. introduction). While the relationship be-
tween a particular input and student performance 
may in fact be negative, nil, or small on average, as 
reported by a great number of studies, such relation-
ship may be positive or large for particular types of 
students, that is, for particular quantiles. Therefore, 
many results found in the literature showing a “no re-
source-effect” may in fact be hiding interesting 
“resource-effects” for specific types of student. The 
same is true for the small (nil) OLS coefficients re-
ported in the last section of this paper. 
Thirdly QR evidence may be very helpful from a policy 
perspective. The effects of a reform are possibly non-
neutral, and identifying who benefits more from each 
input is a requirement for designing accurately tar-
geted policy interventions. For example, if inequalities 
of scores, or a very low educational performance of 
some students, are of concern, then QR allows the 
policymaker to understand what inputs matter for the 
low-performing students who are its main target. If, 
instead, the policymaker prefers to boost the perform-
ance of high-performing students (say, for efficiency 
reasons), he should focus on coefficients associated 
with this sort of student.  
A fourth reason for using QR is related to the hetero-
geneity of students. If a given student population is 
homogeneous with respect to all that matters for 
learning, we do not expect to find great differences in 
the effects of inputs on their performances. However, 
the more heterogeneous is the population, the more 
likely are the coefficients to vary along the distribution 
of scores (when control variables are not enough to 
drive out the existing heterogeneity). As mentioned 
before, we believe that in the SAEB data, there might 
be unobservable heterogeneity of pupil's characteris-
tics that go beyond available controls.19  
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To sum up, QR allows us to map the technology for 
the production of education more precisely, with rele-
vant policy implications. In our case, we study 
whether the performance returns to teachers’ wages 
are the same for different types of students. Eide & 
Showalter (1998) advocated the use of QR by saying 
that they "not only addressed the question 'does 
money matter?' ", but also "for whom does money 
matter?". Accordingly, in this paper QR allows us to 
determine for whom teachers’ wages really matter.  
Technically, QR consist of a generalization of the 
conditional median (or least absolute deviation) esti-
mation, which is in fact an old statistical technique, 
for a long time presented merely as a curiosity in sta-
tistical textbooks because of computational difficul-
ties, among other reasons (Koenker, 2000). It was 
then "rediscovered", developed and introduced in the 
economic literature by Koenker & Bassett (1978). It 
has been generalized as a method of estimation of 
conditional quantile functions for any quantile  of the 
dependent variable. A very interesting feature of QR 
is that all the observations are employed in the esti-
mations, but different weights are assigned to them. 
When estimating quantiles, absolute deviations are 
given positive and negative weights, in such a way 
that a fraction  of the observations lies below the 
fitted line while a fraction (1 – ) lies above it. As  
goes from 0 to 1, the entire distribution of test scores, 
c o n d i t i o n a l  o n  t e a c h e r s  w a g e s 
(STDTEACHERWAGE) and covariates (X and X²), is 
described. θth quantile coefficients are obtained as a 
solution to the expression below: 
We thus estimate Equation 2 for each quantile we 
are interested in, so as to obtain a set of coefficients 
for each quantile:.βθ
 
4.1. Related literature and the procedure we 
adopted 
Some recent papers have used QR to assess the 
effect of resources on student achievement. Eide & 
Showalter (1998) estimate the effect of different 
types of school resources on the conditional distribu-
tion of performance (test score gains) in the US, both 
by OLS and QR. Most of the coefficients are not sta-
tistically significant on average (i.e. by OLS estima-
tion). However, some of them turn out to be statisti-
cally significant for specific quantiles when the QR 
method is used. Levin (2001) studies mainly the ef-
fect of class size, but also of peer effects, on 
achievement of Dutch pupils. His results show a 
strong downward trend in the effect of having more 
pupils of the same IQ in one's class on achievement 
as one moves up the achievement distribution. That 
is, low performing pupils benefit more from ability 
grouping than average or high performing ones.  
Rangvid (2003) estimates peer effects along the con-
ditional distribution of scores for Danish pupils, find-
ing that peer effects are stronger for weak students, 
and that they decrease over the distribution of 
scores. In a setting not far from ours, Billger (2002) 
first uses OLS and QR separately, and then com-
bines IV with QR, in order to estimate the effect of 
teacher pay on student performance in private 
schools in the US. In the latter formulation, she finds 
that higher maximum salaries have no significant im-
pact on the measure of student performance she 
uses.  
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to estimate 
education production functions applying the QR tech-
nique using Brazilian educational data, and probably 
one of the first ones to do so for a developing coun-
try. In order to obtain a clearer picture of the chang-
ing pattern of the effect of wage variables on the dis-
tribution of scores, we estimated Equation 2 for a 
number of quantiles of the test score distribution: 
0.05, 0.10, 0.15, …, 0.90, 0.95, and the extremes 
quantiles 0.01 and 0.99.  
 
4.2. QR results 
Figures 3 to 5 show QR estimations results for all 
estimated quantiles, with OLS coefficients and their 
confidence intervals, for comparison. The pooled 
samples (Figure 3) show quite different results ac-
cording to the subject. In Portuguese, we observe a 
clear overall decreasing pattern of the effect of 
teachers’ wages on the performance of students. 
The coefficient of STDTEACHERWAGE drops from 
a positive and significant level for the lowest end of 
the test scores distribution (5.75, for quantile 
=0.10), to a small but still statistically significant co-
efficient for higher quantiles (1.94, for =0.85). Then 
( )






−−+− 
≥ <∈ β β
θθ
β
βθβθ
 
( )" )"

	
)")"
 
. (2) 
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the coefficient drops further and the conditional rela-
tionship between STDTEACHERWAGE and SCORE 
ceases to exist for the three upper quantiles (=0.90, 
0.95, 0.99). In fact, all coefficients are positive and 
statistically different from zero, except for the three 
upper quantiles. Eight out of the 21 estimated coeffi-
cients fall out of the band defined by confidence in-
tervals around the OLS coefficient (95% level): these 
are exactly those corresponding with the four bottom 
quantiles and with the four upper quantiles. 
According to these results, Portuguese teachers' 
wages are conditionally correlated to a higher extent 
with the scores of low-performing students than with 
those of high-performing students. The highest coef-
ficient obtained (5.75, for =0.10), is 71.13% higher 
than the mean coefficient obtained in the OLS esti-
mation (3.36). Moreover, that highest coefficient is 
almost three times larger than the lowest significant 
coefficient obtained (1.94, for =0.85) and a Wald 
test reveals they are indeed different (see end notes 
24 to 26). To sum up, an increase of 1 unit of Portu-
guese teacher’s wage (1 standard deviation of 
teacher’s wage) corresponds with a change of 5.75 
points of standardized score of pupils situated 
around the 15th quantile of the conditional distribution 
of score, but only with a change of 1.94 points of 
conditional standardized score of pupils situated 
around the 85th quantile.  
In Mathematics, such decreasing pattern is not ob-
served. Almost all the coefficients are small, positive, 
and significant, with four exceptions (=0.01, 0.15, 
0.20, 0.99), and they all oscillate around the corre-
spondent OLS coefficient, without any clear increas-
ing or decreasing trend. The largest coefficient (3.15, 
for =0.60) is only 32.35% larger than the correspon-
dent OLS coefficient, and it falls inside the OLS con-
fidence interval band. The smallest significant coeffi-
cient (1.49, for =0.80) is 37.39% smaller than the 
correspondent OLS coefficient, and also lies within 
the boundaries of the confidence interval. These re-
sults suggest that Mathematics teachers' wages are 
virtually uniformly correlated to scores of students, 
regardless of their conditional performance20. 
When we turn to different types of school, an inter-
esting result is found for private schools (Figure 4) in 
Portuguese. With the exception of three extreme 
quantiles (=0.01, 0.95, 0.99), all coefficients are 
positive and statistically different from zero. The 
overall decreasing pattern verified for the pooled 
sample is reproduced in private schools: Portuguese 
teachers' wages are once again correlated to a 
higher extent with the scores of low-performing stu-
dents than with those of high-performing students. 
However, the effect is considerably intensified. For 
example, the largest coefficient obtained now refers 
to very low-performing students (14.43, for =0.05), 
which is precisely twice as large as the mean coeffi-
cient from the OLS estimation (7.21), and it is more 
than 3,5 times larger than the lowest significant coef-
ficient obtained (4.06, for =0.90). Moreover, QR co-
efficients for private schools are on average two 
times larger than those for the pooled sample. 
In Mathematics, the extreme quantiles coefficients 
from each side of the distribution are not statistically 
different from zero, but apart from that, the overall 
pattern observed in private schools’ QR coefficients 
is very similar to that of the pooled sample ones. QR 
coefficients oscillate around the correspondent OLS 
coefficient, without a clear increasing or decreasing 
trend. Largest and smallest coefficients fall within the 
confidence interval. These results suggest once 
again that Mathematics teachers' wages are virtually 
uniformly correlated to scores of students, regardless 
of their performance. The only relevant difference 
with respect to the pooled sample result is that the 
coefficients for private schools are, on average, 1.5 
times larger than those for the pooled sample. 
Public schools results (Figure 5) are similar across 
subjects at least in two respects: none of the esti-
mated coefficients is statistically different from zero; 
and virtually all coefficients fall within the confidence 
interval. These results suggest that the nil correlation 
of teachers' wages with pupils’ performance, found in 
the OLS estimations, are maintained across the 
whole conditional distribution of scores. Teachers’ 
wages are not conditionally correlated to a larger ex-
tent with any particular type of student. Thus, for 
public schools, QR estimations provide evidence 
supporting the absence of “resource-effect” men-
tioned in the introduction. 
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Until now we have based our analysis of the effect of 
teachers’ wages on scores on an empirical strategy 
which consists essentially of controlling for covari-
ates. We are well aware of the limits of such method, 
since one may fear the presence of selection bias or 
endogeneity in the relationship between teachers' 
wages and students' scores. For different reasons, 
one may suspect that teachers' wages are not ran-
domly assigned to different types of students, even 
after all the efforts made to condition on available co-
variates. Our data being cross-sectional, we were 
somewhat limited in the task of designing a causal 
model. Trying to account for potential endogeneity of 
teachers' wages, we estimated an instrumental vari-
able (IV) model. In the first stage, we estimate teach-
ers' wages as a function of the same set of variables 
used in OLS and QR estimations, but also with a set 
of instruments excluded from the main, second-
stage, equation. The first step is the following:  
 
(STDTEACHERWAGE)i =  + Xi + 	X²i + 
I + i    (3) 
where: X is a vector of control variables, I represents 
the set of instrumental variables that are excluded in 
the second step (assumed to be orthogonal to 
scores) and  is the error term.  
 
In the main equation, we exclude the instruments as-
sumed to be predetermined with respect to students' 
score, especially the gender of the teacher 
(TCHGENDER) and his or her years of experience 
as a teacher (EXPPROF). We assume that whether 
a teacher is a man or a woman is not a factor that is 
likely to influence students’ score directly on aver-
age. However, there is typically a gender gap in 
wages, even when experience, age and other factors 
are controlled for, so that, on average, gender is cor-
related with wages21. Secondly, education production 
functions frequently provide evidence that a 
teacher’s experience, conditional on covariates, has 
no systematic significant impact on scores22. And ex-
perience can be expected to be strongly correlated 
with wages, especially in the public sector. So, in 
principle, these two variables seem to be good can-
didates to be valid instruments: they are correlated 
with the variable we suspect to be endogenous and 
they are correlated with the dependent variable of 
the main equation only through the channel of the 
endogenous variable. In the set of instruments we 
also include the monthly hours of work of a teacher 
(TCHHOURS), whether he or she has another job 
(TCHJOB), and the squares of EXPPROF and 
TCHHOURS. We use the same specification for the 
two subjects, with all these six instruments being 
used as predetermined variables. 
The second step is exactly the same as in the OLS 
specification, except for the fact that we replace the 
p o t e n t i a l l y  e n d o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e 
(STDTEACHERWAGE) by its predicted value from 
the first stage (WAGEHAT). 
(STDSCORE)i =  + (WAGEHAT)i + Xi + X²i + i             (4) 
where: WAGEHAT stands for the predicted value of 
teacher’s wage (based on the first stage), X is a vec-
tor of control variables and  is the error term.  
 
5.1. IV results
Selected results from the second stage of IV estima-
tions for the complete sample are reported in Tables 
5 and 6, and they can be compared with OLS results 
for both subjects (Tables 3 and 4). As a first check of 
the validity of our instruments, we look at the results 
of first stage estimations. First-stage results show 
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that, in both subjects and for all samples, most coeffi-
cients of predetermined instruments are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. More interesting, though, 
is to look at partial R-squared, as well as the F tests 
of the excluded instruments (variables we assume to 
be predetermined) of the first stage regressions. The 
R-squared is reasonably high for all subjects and 
samples (ranging from 0.12 to 0.18) and all F tests 
allow us to reject the hypotheses that the coefficients 
of predetermined variables are zero. As a second 
check of the validity of the instruments, we have 
computed Sargan’s statistic for a test of over-
identification. The test yields good results in Portu-
guese, both for the pooled and for the private 
schools sample (p-values are, respectively, 0.40 and 
0.28), but not so good a result for public schools 
sample (0.09). In Mathematics, p-values are much 
lower for all the samples (0.09, 0.04, 0.03, for the 
pooled, private schools, and public schools samples, 
respectively), casting doubt on the validity of the set 
of instruments. Indeed, in Mathematics, none of the 
coefficients is significant, the standard errors are re-
markably large, and there is even a sign reversal 
(private schools’ coefficient becomes negative). 
Given the doubts placed on the set of instruments, 
we refrain from drawing any further conclusion for 
Mathematics, and we concentrate our analysis on 
Portuguese.  
In Portuguese, for the pooled sample, second-stage 
estimation yields a positive and significant coefficient 
of teacher wages on test scores, as in OLS. The co-
efficient is larger than its OLS counterpart (4.33 vs. 
3.36) and both are significant at the 1% level. The 
same pattern is verified for private schools (8.56 vs. 
7.21), and here both coefficients are also statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are con-
siderably larger in the IV as compared to the OLS 
estimations. In public schools the coefficient is small 
(0.34) and not statistically different from zero, just as 
in OLS. The main qualitative conclusions we had 
drawn in the OLS section are thus preserved when 
we instrument teacher’s wage. The coefficients ob-
tained for the pooled and for the private schools 
samples are larger than the correspondent OLS 
ones, suggesting that OLS coefficients underesti-
mated the effect of teachers’ wages on scores, pos-
sibly because of a selection problem23. 
 
5.2. Combining QR with IV: two-stage least  
absolute deviation 
Just as we extended the estimation of conditional 
means (OLS) to the estimation of coefficients that 
vary along the distribution of conditional scores (QR), 
it is natural to proceed in an analogous way extend-
ing the IV model in a similar manner. The idea un-
derlying this combination of two techniques (QR and 
IV) is to cope simultaneously with both problems that 
are likely to bias our OLS coefficients, namely the 
heterogeneity of students’ response to variation in 
teachers’ wages and the possible endogeneity of 
teachers’ wages. This combination of QR with IV has 
been called two-stage least absolute deviation 
(2SLAD). Levin (2001) and Billger (2002) have re-
cently applied it in education production functions. 
Consistency and asymptotic normality of the 2SLAD 
estimator have been shown by Amemiya (1982), 
Powell (1983) and Chen & Portney (1996).  
The procedure consists of regressing the endoge-
nous variable (STDTEACHERWAGE) on all instru-
ments (including predetermined ones) in the first 
stage through OLS, and then using the fitted values 
from the first stage (WAGEHAT) as the explanatory 
variable in the second stage (in the QR). So the sec-
ond step consists of estimating the effects of the in-
strumented variable (WAGEHAT) on student 
achievement (STDSCORE) at different points in the 
conditional test score distribution. 
The overall preciseness of the estimations is re-
duced when we apply 2SLAD, instead of plain QR 
estimations, which translates into a greater number 
of non-significant coefficients in 2SLAD regressions. 
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The preciseness of IV estimations is also reduced 
with respect to OLS, and the IV confidence bands 
(Figure 6) are larger than the OLS ones. 
Results for Mathematics are not quite reliable for the 
reasons outlined before. Indeed, very few coeffi-
cients are statistically different from zero at usual lev-
els of confidence. 
Nevertheless, for Portuguese, a considerable num-
ber of coefficients still remain statistically significant24 
and, more importantly, the main qualitative results 
obtained using QR remain when we turn to 2SLAD. 
The effect of teachers’ wages on pupils’ scores de-
creases with the performance of students, both in the 
pooled sample (Figure 6A) and in the private schools 
sample (Figure 6B). In both cases, the coefficients 
for low quantiles (=0.05 and 0.10) are the largest 
significant ones, and exactly those which lie outside 
IV coefficients confidence interval. In the pooled 
sample, they are, respectively, 11.19 and 10.06, 
while in the private schools sample they are, respec-
tively, 18.45 and 17.30. In public schools, although 
we can observe a slightly decreasing pattern (Figure 
6C), teachers’ wages are not correlated to a large 
extent with any particular type of student, since there 
are no significant coefficients, and almost all of them 
lie inside IV confidence band. 
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All our results using the Portuguese sample support 
the three hypotheses tested in the paper: (i) on aver-
age, teachers’ wages do have a significant positive 
effect on students test scores, although the coeffi-
cients are small – it should be emphasized, however, 
that coefficients are small here, but not nil, possibly 
because we are dealing with a developing country 
data with a substantial variability in teachers’ wages; 
(ii) in private schools, which are typically funded and 
managed in a decentralized fashion, and in which 
richer families enroll their children, coefficients for 
teachers’ wages are positive, significant, and higher 
than those of the public schools sample and of the 
pooled sample; (iii) the achievement impact of an ad-
ditional unit of teacher wage is not the same for all 
types of student: the positive effect of teacher quality 
(as measured by his wage) is more important for low-
performing pupils. The credibility of our results is re-
inforced, since they are preserved in qualitative 
terms when we correct for potential endogeneity of 
teacher wages using IV and 2SLAD. Not surprisingly, 
the coefficients of IV and 2SLAD are less precise 
than their OLS and QR counterparts. 
In Mathematics, OLS results suggest that teachers’ 
wages do matter for student performance, and they 
are more pronounced in private schools. QR results 
also provide evidence of heterogeneity, since some 
estimated coefficients are different across quantiles. 
So, there is also evidence in support of hypotheses 
(i), (ii) and (iii). However, we can not identify a de-
creasing pattern as clear as in Portuguese and some 
key coefficients are not different across quantiles25. 
Moreover, OLS and QR results are not reproduced in 
IV and 2SLAD estimations. 
A puzzling issue is why the results we obtain for 
teachers' wages are so different from one subject to 
the other. Of course, when we instrument teachers' 
wages (IV and 2SLAD models), the differences could 
be due to the weakness of the instruments in Mathe-
matics. For example, while an instrument such as 
teachers’ gender was likely to be endogenous in 
Mathematics, it was more likely to be exogenous in 
Portuguese. This could be explained by differences 
in the nature of pupil-teacher relationship (gender-
sensitive only in one subject) or due to different labor 
market characteristics, such as the gender composi-
tion of teachers’ population. A male teacher seems 
to have a direct negative impact on scores in the 
Mathematics exam (not through the channel of 
wages), meaning the few female mathematics teach-
ers perform better than their male counterparts.  
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However, there are striking differences in the results 
across subjects, which are not related to the use of 
instruments. When we compare the QR results, we 
observe that, while in Portuguese there is a decreas-
ing effect of teachers’ wages on scores, in Mathe-
matics the QR line is a flat one, indicating a more 
similar effect of teachers’ wages on good and bad 
pupils. This is true both in the pooled samples and in 
the private samples. We don’t have a good explana-
tion for those different patterns. Understanding what 
explains that difference and what that implies in 
terms of educational policies are topics that would 
require further research. 
Some policy implications are more transparent, 
though. It seems clear that public schools have 
scope for improving their human resources policies. 
The most important policy objective related to the 
management of teacher hiring and teacher payment 
would be to introduce some form of reward to per-
formance. This could be achieved through the as-
signment of higher salaries to better candidates, fos-
tering competition for new (good) teachers with the 
private schools and other sectors of the economy. 
Alternatively, some form of merit pay (through a bo-
nus system for instance) could be introduced. The 
latter is however likely to face opposition from a sec-
tor where, traditionally, pay is only related to senior-
ity. In the US, resistance to the use of merit pay in 
the public sector appears to be caused by specific 
circumstances such as the opposition of teacher un-
ions (Ballou, 2001). According to our results, it would 
be all the more relevant to attract and reward teacher 
quality in the public sector as the lowest achieving 
pupils seem to benefit most from this resource – to 
be sure, in the literacy exam. 
.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Using a good-quality dataset coming from a develop-
ing country and employing a more flexible functional 
form than the ones that are commonly used in the 
economics of education literature, we estimated edu-
cation production functions in order to evaluate the 
magnitude of the cross-sectional correlation between 
teachers’ wages and students' achievement, condi-
tional on an extensive set of covariates. We used 
OLS (IV) methods to asses whether teachers’ wages 
matter for pupils’ scores, and we employed QR 
(2SLAD) to determine for whom teachers’ wages 
matter. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to 
estimate education production functions applying the 
QR technique using Brazilian educational data, and 
probably one of the first ones to do so for a develop-
ing country.  
We do not claim our results provide a strong causal 
relationship between teachers’ wages and students’ 
scores. But they do contain insightful evidence of the 
intricate relationship between these variables, since 
we used a great number of controls across the esti-
mations; we examined teachers’ wages effects for all 
schools, but also separately for private and public 
schools; we used different econometric techniques; 
and we found contrasting results in different sub-
jects. A possible path for further research is to test 
our three hypotheses again by using different strate-
gies of identification. 
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All schools (pooled sample) Private schools Public schools 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
SCORE 249.31 49.85 279.06 45.27 232.73 44.26 
TEACHERWAGE 5.08 3.16 5.98 3.69 4.57 2.69 
       
GENDER 0.46 0.50     
AGE 14.92 1.58 14.12 0.94 15.37 1.68 
BLACK 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.28 
MIXED 0.37 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.43 0.49 
MISCED 3.27 1.21 4.17 0.92 2.77 1.05 
NONNUCLEAR 0.35 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.39 0.49 
NMAIDS 0.60 1.01 1.24 1.13 0.24 0.71 
NBOOKS 1.50 0.68     
       
RETENTION 0.55 0.84 0.23 0.56 0.73 0.92 
HMWK 1.95 0.97     
       
PRINCWAGE 0.00 1.00     
LIBRARY 0.82 0.39 0.90 0.29 0.77 0.42 
AIR 0.84 0.37     
LIGHT 0.92 0.26     
NCOMP 10.14 16.01 21.07 20.93 4.05 7.15 
STRATIO 35.28 9.81     
       
TAXPERHEAD 103.17 101.79 116.73 107.49 95.62 97.65 
       
TCHGENDER 0.18 0.38     
TCHHOURS 117.07 46.08     
TCHEXP 3.35 1.18     
TCHJOB 0.16 0.36     
tchcollege 0.91 0.28     
Number of obs. 28,605  10,238  18,367  
Variable 
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All schools (pooled sample)  Private schools Public schools 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
SCORE 258.02 53,45 295.37 50.54 236.89 42.34 
       
TEACHERWAGE 5.39 3.43 6.62 3.85 4.69 2.95 
       
GENDER 0.47 0.50     
AGE 14.91 1.58 14.12 0.95 15.36 1.68 
BLACK 0.07 0.26 0.03 0.18 0.09 0.29 
MIXED 0.37 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.42 0.49 
MISCED 3.28 1.20 4.16 0.92 2.78 1.05 
NONNUCLEAR  0.34 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.39 0.49 
NMAIDS 0.60 1.01 1.24 1.12 0.24 0.71 
NBOOKS 1.50 0.68     
       
RETENTION 0.55 0.84 0.22 0.55 0.73 0.92 
HMWK 1.90 0.98     
       
PRINCWAGE 0.00 1.00     
LIBRARY 0.82 0.38 0.91 0.29 0.77 0.42 
AIR 0.84 0.37     
LIGHT 0.93 0.26     
NCOMP 10.32 16.51 21.33 21.80 4.09 7.10 
STRATIO 35.31 9.81     
       
TAXPERHEAD 104.35 102.76 118.10 108.72 96.58 98.38 
       
TCHGENDER 0.55 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.52 0.50 
TCHHOURS 123.93 45.76 128.47 47.09 121.36 44.79 
TCHEXP 3.29 1.20     
TCHJOB 0.23 0.42     
TCHCOLLEGE 0.88 0.32     
Number of obs. 27,942  10,095  17,847  
Variable  
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All Schools  Private Public 
Coef.  Std.Dev.  Coef. Std.Dev. Coef. Std.Dev. 
STDTEACHERWAGE 3.36 *** 0.61 7.21 *** 1.17 0.41  0.82 
GENDER -15.67 *** 0.99 -21.51 *** 1.79 -15.20 *** 1.39 
AGE 16.13 *** 5.73 70.46 *** 14.37 8.82  7.78 
AGE² -0.75 *** 0.18 -2.60 *** 0.48 -0.57 ** 0.24 
BLACK -16.26 *** 2.01 -23.75 *** 5.10 -16.08 *** 2.52 
MIXED -4.25 *** 1.07 -5.70 *** 2.06 -3.43 ** 1.46 
RETENTION -32.28 *** 1.83 -51.95 *** 4.49 -28.96 *** 2.33 
RETENTION² 8.80 *** 0.70 11.35 *** 2.01 8.12 *** 0.86 
HMWK 24.24 *** 1.98 22.20 *** 3.95 27.37 *** 2.66 
HMWK² -4.83 *** 0.55 -4.37 *** 1.06 -5.39 *** 0.75 
MISCED -1.59  2.34 5.68  6.23 -0.44  3.29 
MISCED² 1.32 *** 0.36 0.39  0.84 1.22 ** 0.55 
NONNUCLEAR -14.19 *** 1.03 -18.41 *** 2.03 -13.85 *** 1.40 
NMAIDS -1.82  2.13 5.07 * 2.87 -20.63 *** 4.34 
NMAIDS² 1.78 ** 0.80 -0.03  1.05 8.00 *** 1.69 
NBOOKS 24.92 *** 4.57 22.78 *** 7.10 40.27 *** 8.03 
NBOOKS² -3.97 *** 1.21 -3.14 * 1.78 -8.26 *** 2.25 
PRINCWAGE  4.06 *** 0.72 5.95 *** 1.25 3.09 *** 1.17 
PRINCWAGE² -0.47  0.59 -0.09  1.02 -2.12 ** 0.95 
LIBRARY 3.37 ** 1.33 2.02  3.17 5.51 *** 1.71 
PRIVATE 39.05 *** 1.59       
AIR -1.84  1.50 1.21  3.86 -1.92  1.91 
LIGHT 3.77 * 2.04 3.12  6.32 4.03  2.48 
NCOMP 0.50 *** 0.08 0.35 *** 0.12 0.31  0.24 
NCOMP² 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.01  0.01 
STRATIO -0.09  0.24 -0.09  0.37 0.16  0.39 
STRATIO ² 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.01 
TAXPERHEAD 0.16 *** 0.02 0.18 *** 0.04 0.18 *** 0.02 
TAXPERHEAD² 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 
TCHCOLLEGE 8.30 *** 1.85 12.49 *** 4.42 9.74 *** 2.38 
STATE DUMMIES 
(UF1 – UF27) 
yes  yes yes 
Constant 345.74 *** 45.88 -55.69  110.32 428.72 *** 62.95 
R squared 0.34   0.22   0.17   
Number of Obs. 28,605   10,238   18,367   
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 All Schools  Private Schools Public Schools 
Coef. Std.Dev. Coef. Std.Dev. Coef. Std.Dev. 
STDTEACHERWAGE 2.38 *** 0.59 3.94 *** 1.12 0.20  0.84 
GENDER 26.52 *** 0.92 24.87 *** 1.72 36.29 *** 1.36 
AGE -10.66 ** 5.38 33.42 ** 13.75 -17.46 ** 7.73 
AGE² 0.08  0.17 -1.47 *** 0.46 0.20  0.24 
BLACK -21.19 *** 1.83 -28.95 *** 4.86 -23.84 *** 2.42 
MIXED -7.86 *** 0.99 -8.76 *** 1.96 -8.64 *** 1.44 
RETENTION -29.88 *** 1.71 -53.59 *** 4.32 -27.65 *** 2.30 
RETENTION² 8.20 *** 0.65 12.20 *** 1.92 7.82 *** 0.85 
HMWK 17.77 *** 1.82 13.30 *** 3.65 21.69 *** 2.63 
HMWK² -3.23 *** 0.51 -1.68 * 1.00 -4.15 *** 0.74 
MISCED -8.06 *** 2.19 2.55  6.11 -2.09  3.27 
MISCED² 2.42 *** 0.34 1.14  0.83 1.50 *** 0.55 
NONNUCLEAR -16.13 *** 0.97 -23.12 *** 1.95 -15.59 *** 1.39 
NMAIDS 8.84 *** 1.99 13.59 *** 2.78 -4.90  4.25 
NMAIDS² -1.84 ** 0.75 -3.44 *** 1.02 3.21 * 1.66 
NBOOKS 30.16 *** 4.26 32.65 *** 6.82 48.93 *** 7.97 
NBOOKS² -5.39 *** 1.13 -5.75 *** 1.72 -10.47 *** 2.24 
PRINCWAGE  4.83 *** 0.68 8.26 *** 1.18 2.19 * 1.17 
PRINCWAGE² 0.27  0.56 -0.23  0.98 -1.18  0.96 
LIBRARY 2.35 * 1.25 2.48  3.13 5.17 *** 1.70 
PRIVATE 45.58 *** 1.47       
AIR -3.13 ** 1.42 -7.81 ** 3.79 -0.40  1.91 
LIGHT 5.79 *** 1.96 17.75 *** 6.23 4.69 * 2.52 
NCOMP 0.76 *** 0.07 0.77 *** 0.11 -0.29  0.24 
NCOMP² 0.00 *** 0.00 -0.01 *** 0.00 0.04 *** 0.01 
STRATIO -0.51 ** 0.22 -1.10 *** 0.34 -0.05  0.39 
STRATIO ² 0.01 * 0.00 0.01 *** 0.00 0.00  0.01 
TAXPERHEAD 0.09 *** 0.02 0.15 *** 0.04 0.12 *** 0.02 
TAXPERHEAD² 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 
TCHCOLLEGE 1.66  1.55 8.85 ** 3.57 1.31  2.15 
STATE DUMMIES 
(UF1 – UF27) 
yes yes 
Constant 548.06 *** 43.04 213.10 ** 104.30 618.02 *** 62.71 
R squared 0.44   0.29   0.22   
Number of Obs. 27,942   10,095   17,847   
yes  
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1st stage All schools  Private schools Public schools 
 Coef.  Std.Dev. Coef.  Std.Dev. Coef.  Std.Dev. 
TCHGENDER 0.18 *** 0.01 0.19 *** 0.19 0.15 *** 0.02 
TCHHOURS 0.01 *** 4.90E-04 0.01 *** 7.50E-04 -4.48E-04  6.70E-04 
TCHHOURS² -1.21E-05 *** 2.13E-06 3.09E-05 *** 3.28E-06 2.02E-05 *** 2.92E-06 
TCHEXP 0.15 *** 0.02 0.02  0.03 0.24 *** 0.03 
TCHEXP² 4.90E-03  3.16E-03 0.02 ** 5.20E-03 -1.50E-03  4.00E-03 
TCHJOB -0.09 *** 0.01 -0.14 *** 0.019 -0.11 *** 0.02 
R2 0.15   0.16   0.16   
Number of Obs 28,605   10,238   18,367   
Sargan 0.401   0.283   0.089   
          
2nd stage Private schools Public schools 
 Coef.  Std.Dev. Coef.  Std.Dev. Coef.  Std.Dev. 
STDTEACHERWAGE 4.33 *** 1.57 8.56 *** 2.90 0.34  2.03 
R2 0.34   0.22   0.43   
Number of Obs 28,605   10,238   18,367   
All schools  
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1st stage All schools  Private schools  Public Schools 
 Coef.  Std.Dev. Coef.  Std.Dev. Coef.  Std.Dev. 
TCHGENDER 0.11 *** 0.01 0.17 *** 0.02 0.08 *** 0.01 
TCHHOURS 3.70E-03 *** 5.20E-04 4.00E-03 *** 8.80E-04 4.00E-03 *** 6.95E-04 
TCHHOURS² 3.65E-06 * 2.21E-06 2.730E-
06 
 3.66E-06 2.92E-06  2.96E-06 
TCHEXP 0.03 * 0.02 0.07 * 0.04 -0.0031  0.03 
TCHEXP² 0.02 *** 3.00E-03 6.00E-03  0.01 0.032 *** 3.85E-03 
TCHJOB -0.12 *** 0.01 -0.05 ** 0.02 -0.17 *** 0.01 
R2 0.15   0.12   0.18   
Number of Obs 27,942   10,095   17,847   
Sargan 0.086   0.042   0.03   
          
2nd stage Private schools Public schools 
 Coef.  Std.Dev. Coef.  Std.Dev. Coef.  Std.Dev. 
STDTEACHERWAGE 0.30  1.52 -2.63  3.16 0.02  1.98 
R2 0.44   0.29   0.22   
Number of Obs 27,942   10,095   17,847   
All schools  
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